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The Securities and Exchange Commission's civil complaint in the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission v. National Student Marketing Cor-
poration case' has evoked widespread and well justified interest on the
part of the two professional groups most intimately involved in the fed-
eral securities regulatory scheme: lawyers and accountants. Members of
both professions are among the defendants in that suit, and as to both the
Commission asserts a duty which both professions may fairly regard as
without present legal foundation: a duty to blow the whistle on one's
client. It is the purpose of this article to consider that asserted duty as re-
spects public accountants-with an occasional comparative glance at the
situation of lawyers.
Before addressing this novel question of accountants' responsibilities
it may be appropriate to sketch in the general framework of the duties and
liabilities of accountants under the federal securities laws within which
the question arises. This familiar ground may most usefully be covered
for present purposes under four heads: the kinds of factual situations in
which questions as to accountants' duties and liabilities may arise; the
kinds of liability the accountant may incur for failure to discharge his
duties; the particular sources of the accountants' duties enforceable under
the securities laws; and the varying degrees of exigence that character-
ize such duties.
I. THE FRAMEWORK
A. The Factual Settings
There are four principal factual situations in which questions as to
accountants' duties and liabilities may arise. The first and most familiar
situation, and the one giving rise to the most extensive responsibility, is
that in which the accountant has issued his opinion on financial state-
ments, following an examination in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards.' The opinion is the result and emblem of the public
Member of the District of Columbia Bar and the Connecticut Bar.
See Complaint, SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civ. No. 225-72, [1971-
1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 93,360 [hereinafter referred to as NSMC].
2 See AICPA, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 1 §§ 510-561 (1973). [Here-
inafter SAS 1].
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accountant's most exalted role-that of independent auditor-and it is
this role which the accountant is principally called upon by the federal
securities laws to perform.3
The second situation is that in which the accountant is associated with
unaudited financial statements which are accompanied by his disclaimer
of opinion, the disclaimer serving both to acknowledge a limited degree
of responsibility for the financial statements, and to make clear that he
has not audited the financial statements and that he does not express an
opinion as to the fair presentation of what they purport to show.4 Al-
though there are numerous instances where unaudited (principally in-
terim) financial statements are required to be filed with the Commission,
or are included in documents subject to the Commission's jurisdiction,'
and although in many instances the accountant will have had some hand
in the preparation of the unaudited financial statements, there is not, as
in the case of audited financial statements, any statutory requirement for
such participation.
The third situation is that in which the accountant has participated in
the preparation of financial or other material for his client, but has taken
no ostensible responsibility for the material by way of an opinion or dis-
claimer, or otherwise. Where the material so prepared is in the form of
financial statements, an accountant subject to the Code of Professional
Ethics of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
[AICPA] may not properly avoid appending a disclaimer to such finan-
cial statements, together with, perforce, his name.0 Even accountants
not members of the AICPA are in all likelihood effectively bound by
this professional standard.7 There is nonetheless an area in which an ac-
countant may quite properly prepare financial data other than such state-
3 See, e.g., SEC, REGULATIONS S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02 (1973); Securities Act of
1933, Schedule A (29), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(29) (1970); SEC Form 10-k Instructions as to
financial statements, 3 CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 31,106. [Hereinafter the Securities Act
of 1933 will be referred to as the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
will be referred to as the Exchange Act].
4 See SAS I § 516.01-13; Cf. Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1969).
5E.g., SEC Form S-1, Item 6, Summary of Earnings, 1 CCII FED. SEC. L REP. 5 7123;
SEC Form 16-Q, Item H, Presentation of Financial Information, 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
5 31,031.
61n 1967 AICPA, STATEMENT ON AUDITING PROCEDURE; No. 38, now reflected in
SAS 1 § 516.01-13, imposed these requirements and effectively abolished the previous practice
of issuing "plain paper" statements. The Institute's Restated Code of Professional Ethics,
effective March 1, 1973, makes compliance with such requirements an ethical imperative.
See AICPA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Rule 202 (1973).
7 This would follow from the general rule that one who undertakes to perform profes-
sional service is bound by the standards of the profession, See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A (1965), and the fact that AICPA pronouncements such as the SAS are the
most authoritative statements available as to the standards of the accounting profession.
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ments for his client, without requiring that his name or a disclaimer be
attached thereto; for example, he may make calculations or prepare tabu-
lations from which the client may in turn draw data which are published
without attribution.'
The final and most significant factual situation for the purposes of
this paper is that in which the accountant has knowledge bf actionable
fault on the part of his client or of persons associated with the client, but
where the fault does not relate to matters for which the accountant is
actually or ostensibly responsible. Such fault may pertain to misstate-
ments or omissions in filings or other documents, where the accountant
has some responsibility for the document because it contains financial
statements which the accountant has examined or prepared, but the error
pertains to a portion of the document for which he has no responsibility-
as, for example, material error, not related to the financial statements, in
the textual portion of the prospectus. Alternatively, it may relate to mis-
conduct, whether by omission or commission, with which the accountant
has no contact beyond his mere knowledge: as, for example, a failure by
the client to make a required filing, or an error or omission in a filing
which contains no financial statements.
B. Categories of Liability
The kinds of liability to which an accountant may be subject for fail-
ure to discharge his duties under the federal securities laws may be con-
veniently identified in terms of the four principal kinds of proceedings
in which liability may be assessed: civil damage suits, criminal proceed-
ings, civil injunctive actions instituted by the Commission, and admin-
istrative proceedings by the Commission.
As respects civil liability, the principal statutory provisions, and in-
deed the only ones that really deserve serious discussion, are two: Sec-
tion 11 of the Securities Ac and § lob of the Exchange Act10 and Rule
10b-511 thereunder. The former imposes the most stringent liability,
in a number of respects; 12 but, alas for the plaintiffs' bar, its availability
is limited to those cases where a registration statement or prospectus
SSee Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
0 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
10 15 U.S.C. § 78j(6) (1970).
1117 C.F.R. § 240.10b.5 (1973).
'
2 The standard of liability is negligence, see text at Note 54, inra, the burden of proof
with respect to whether the necessary care was exercised is on the defendant, § 11(b); no
reliance is required unless the plaintiff purchased the securities after the registrant had made
public an earnings statement covering the period of at least a year following the effective date
of the registration statement, § 11(a), and the burden of proof as to lack of causation of
damages is on the defendant, § 11(e).
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under the 1933 Act is involved-a limitation which would be largely
loosened by the American Law Institute's Draft Federal Securities Code.18
Rule 10b-5, on the other hand, is of broad applicability-not unlimited,
to be sure,1 4 but nonetheless broad enough to cover virtually any situation
in which a private damage claim can be laid under other provisions of
the Securities Acts; but it is markedly less stringent in effect than § 11.1d
This too would largely be changed by the ALI's Draft Code.10
There are a number of other provisions of the Securities Acts which
are frequently invoked in suits involving accountants as defendants. In
one or more respects each of them is of narrower applicability or of
lesser utility to plaintiffs than the two prime provisions just discussed,
and they are thus of little practical importance. These provisions are §
12(2) of the Securities Act,17 § 17(a) of the Securities Act,'8 and § 18
13 ALI, Federal Securities Code, Tentative Draft No. 2 § 1403 (March 1973), Section
1403 of the proposed Code is an adaptation of § 11 of the Securities Act but would apply
not only to the "offering statement" which is the Code's equivalent to the Securities Act regis-
tration statement, but also to the equivalents to the Exchange Act registration statements filed
in connection with issuer registration and Form 10-K annual report filed with the Commission,
See also, H. BLOOMENTHAL AND S. WING, SECURITIES LAW 8-278 (1973).
14 There is still a requirement that the misrepresentation be made in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, though this seems to become incieasingly attenuated. See, o,g,
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. Rop. 5 94,344 (7th Cir. 1973);
Mount Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC L. REP.
5 93,552 (9th Cir. 1973).
151 In addition to a higher threshold of liability, see text at Notes 55 through 58, hi,!ra,
there are still under rule lOb-5 at least vestiges of requirements of a showing of reliance and
causation, see 2 BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, §§ 8.6, 8.7; and the burden of proof
as to all elements to the cause of action is at least theoretically upon the plaintiff. 1d, §
8.4(332), (528).
1 See H. BLOOMENTHAL AND S. WING, supra note 13, at 13-266.
17 15 U.S.C. § 771(2). This section provides for liability to a purchaser of securities of
one who offers or sells the securities by means of a communication which includes a material
misstatement or omission. The standard of liability, as under § 11, is negligence, and the
burden of proof as to that element is as with § 11 on the defendant. This section is ordinar-
ily read to require privity between the defendant and the plaintiff, see Barlas v. Bear, Stearns
& Co. (N.D. Ill. March 31, 1966), '64-'66 CCH DEC. 5 91,674), but cl, Free v. Szabo Food
Service, Inc. (N.D. Ill. January 4, 1964) '62-'64 CCH DEC. 5 91,317, and so would exclude
in ordinary circumstances a claim against an auditor resting purely on responsibility for fi-
nancial statements. Despite this, it seems to be frequently invoked in complaints against
accountants. It has been held to support a claim of aiding and abetting. In Re Caesar's Pal-
ace Securities Litigation, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 94,005 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
18 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970). This provision is in substance identical to rule 10b-5 under
the 1934 Act, except that it is limited to offers and sales of securities, whereas the latter
applies to purchases as well. For an example of its invocation in civil damage actions against
accountants, see State Mutual Assurance Co. of America v. Arthur Andersen & Co., (S.D.N.Y.
September 10, 1971), '71-'72 CCH DEC. 5 93,217 (summary of complaint). The standard
of liability is not spelled out in the statutory provision, but has, as with its Exchange Act
twin, been generally held to require something more than ordinary negligence. See Fischman
v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); contra, Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270
(9th Cir. 1961).
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of the Exchange Act. 9 Also occasionally invoked is § 14(e) of the Ex-
change Act. 0
Criminal liability may arise in any of the circumstances in which there
would be civil liability under the provisions of the Securities Acts de-
scribed in the two foregoing paragraphs, provided only that there is a
showing of criminal scienter; for willful violation of any of the prohibi-
tions of the Securities Act is punishable under § 24 of that actCl and the
same sanction is provided with respect to the Exchange Act by § 32.2
Although these are the applicable criminal provisions of the securities
laws as such, they do not appear, as a practical matter, to be the principal
statutory provisions on which federal securities prosecutions rest. The
main prosecutorial implements for this purpose appear to be the mail
fraud statute,2- 3 which by providing for a separate crime for each item
placed in the United States mails, allows an almost infinite multiplication
of counts; and the conspiracy statute, -4 the virtues of which as a prosecu-
tor's tool are well known and need not be recounted here.2' The typical
pattern of prosecution in which accountants are involved is likely to in-
clude one or the other, if not both, of the discussed provisions of the
Securities Act, plus a sprinkling of separate counts under the mail fraud
statute, plus a conspiracy count gluing the whole together.2"
Injunctive actions to restrain the repetition or future commission of
violations of the Securities Acts may be brought by the Commission under
19 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970). This section predicates liability upon filings with the SEC
which contain material misstatements or omissions. The statutory language itself makes dear
that the plaintiff has the burden of showing reliance and causation, and that while the burden
o'proof as to fault is on the defendant, the standard of care is good faith and lack of knowl-
edge-that is, the standard of fault is fraud. For a case involving the assertion of liability
against an accountant under this provision see Fischer v. Klet, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
20 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970). This provision, like § 17 of the Securities Act and rule
lob-5 under the Exchange Act, is purely prohibitory in terms but has been construed to imply
a private right of action. It prohibits, inter alia, material misstatements and omissions in
connection with tender offers and solicitations of proxies. There do not appear to have been
any reported cases in which this provision has been successfully invoked against an accountant
defendant. Cf. Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., CCH FED. SEC L. REP. 5 94,749 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
21 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970).
2215 U.S.C. § 78ff (1970).
23 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1970).
24 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
2 5 See, e.g., Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities and Related
Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEo. WASIL L. REV.
901, 937-938 (1971).
2 6 See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S.
1006 (1970); Indictment, United States v. Goldblum, Crim. No. - [1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 5 94,200 (C.D. Calif. 1973) (the Equity Funding case); Indict-
ment, United States v. Clark, Crim. No. 72-138 (S.D.N.Y.) (the Four Seasons case).
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either § 20 of the Securities Act,27 or § 21 of the Exchange Act."8 As a
general matter, it would seem, the utility to the Commission of an in-
junction restraining the repetition of a particular violation by an accoun-
tant is slight, since the chances are that the client whose financial state-
ments were involved in the violation and the accountant would have long
since parted company. Presumably for this reason the current trend in
Commission enforcement actions appears to be to seek an injunction
against all future violations of whichever prohibitory provisions can be
invoked. Thus the defendant is enjoined to go and sin no more, the
value of the injunction presumably being to make future enforcement
actions easier to bring successfully.
A high proportion of the Commission's injunction actions result in
relief by consent; and such relief sometimes takes special forms not so
likely to be available from a court in a contested trial. Thus, in SEC v.
Rafer,29 the accountant was not only enjoined from violation of registra-
tion and anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, but also re-
quired to serve copies of the court's opinion, findings, and judgment on
all existing and prospective clients for the following three years, and to
file an affidavit with the court and the Commission certifying his compli-
ance with the order. In a more recent case, involving the national firm of
Laventhol Krekstein Horwath & Horwath [LKH&H],80 the court's de-
cree, entered by consent, requires the defendant accounting firm to adopt
an internal quality control system, to adhere to it, and to submit to an in-
spection by a team selected by the Commission for the purpose of deter.
mining whether its compliance is satisfactory."1
The final variety of proceeding which an accountant may face for
dereliction of his obligations is an administrative proceeding under rule
2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice."2  The sanctions available
under this rule are disbarment and suspension, which have been applied
not only to individual practitioners, but to entire firms as well8-even
27 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1970).
28 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1970).
2
9No. 70 Civ. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), reported in SEC Litigation Release No. 4581
(April 3, 1970).
30 SEC v. Everest Management Corp., No. 71 Civ. 4932 (S,D.N.Y. 1973) discussed in
SEC Accounting Series Release No. 144 (May 23, 1973).
31 Similar relief is apparently sought in Complaint, SEC v. Talley Industries Inc., No.
73 Civ. 4603 [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC L REP. 5 94,198 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
32 17 C.F.R. § 201-2(e) (1973).
33 See, e.g., SEC Accounting Series Release No. 78 (Mar. 25, 1957) (firm suspended for
15 days); SEC Accounting Series Release No. 73 (Oct. 10, 1952) (firm suspended for ten
days); SEC Accounting Series Release No. 68 (July 5, 1949) (firm suspended for 30 days);
SEC Accounting Series Release No. 59 (Jan. 23, 1947) (firm suspended for one year).
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though the rule itself does not in terms refer to firms. Suspension or dis-
barment'for an accountant or firm, of course, does not have the same pri-
mary meaning as for lawyers, the principal other practitioners who are
subject to rule 2(e). The lawyers' principal (though not exclusive) func-
tion with respect to practice before the Commission, so far as rule 2 (e) is
concerned, is in the representation of others in proceedings, formal or in-
formal, before the Commission. Although accountants are also involved
to some extent in representation of an informal sort, practice before the
Commission in their case means principally the acc4tance by the Com-
mission of opinions which they have issued on financial statements.3
Thus disbarment or suspension means in practice the refusal of the Com-
mission to accept an opinion issued after audit by the accountant or firm
concerned. The impact of this penalty is, where a firm is concerned, felt
not merely by the firm but by its continuing clients, who may thereby be
prevented from ma1ing filings on time, getting registration statements
effective, and the like. It is, therefore, a rather blunt instrument; and
the larger the accounting firm, the thicker is its edge, and the larger the
number of clients that may be involved. Perhaps in part for this reason,
the suspensions of large firms have been of limited duration.
Rule 2(e) in itself does not offer more flexible or discriminating
sanctions; but the threat of that blunt instrument has been used to secure
by means of consent a range of other remedies. These include effective
suspension or disbarment of particular offices;35 a prohibition on taking
on new clients for a specified period;-" and a requirement, parallel to that
imposed by the court order upon LKH&H, " for adoption, compliance
with, and submission to an inspection of a system of quality control."
C. Sources of Particular Duties of Accountants
The obligations of accountants under the federal securities laws are
given shape and definition by pronouncements from three principal
sources: the Commission, the profession, and the courts. The sources
are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, each draws on the others.
The Commission's pronouncements are principally in the form of
either regulations, or interpretive releases-the latter being the more
34 See rule 2(g) (2), 17 C.F.R. § 201-2(g) (2) (1973).
35 See SEC Accounting Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974).
36 Id.
3 7 In the LKH&H case, see note 30 supra and accompanying text, a Rule 2(e) consent
order and judicial consent decree were combined evidently so as to provide a more comprehen-
sive pattern of relief than would be available from either procedure by itself.
38 See SEC Accounting Series Release No. 153 (Feb. 25, 1974).
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numerous. Almost all of the releases deal either with the subject of in-
dependence, or with accounting presentation. On the former subject,
there are both a regulation 9 and a series of. release,40 which in the aggre-
gate set out a quite detailed set of rules for transgression of which the
sanction may be either disqualification of the accountant or firm by refus-
al to accept its report in connection with a particular filing, or a sanction
under rule 2 (e). On accounting presentation there have also been a num-
ber of accounting series releases, 41 although in this area the Commission
has also paid considerable deference to pronouncements by the profession,
through the Accounting Principles Board [APB], and has lately declared
its intention to give similar deference to the pronouncements of the
APB's successor, the Financial Accounting Standards Board.42  By rule
the Commission has also issued quite detailed guidance as to the form
of financial statements and schedules to be filed with the Commission.
In addition, the Commission has by rule prescribed in part the content of
the auditor's report.4"
The one area in which the Commission has not issued pronounce-
ments of general and binding effect is that of auditing. Indeed, the con-
trast between the extent to which the Commission has exercised authority
in the fields of independence, accounting, and reporting on the one band,
and auditing on the other, is striking. In 1940 as a result of its study of
the McKesson-Robbins affair, the Commission issued an amendment to
its comprehensive Regulation S-X which prescribed that thenceforth audi-
tor's reports to be acceptable for filing with the Commission must, inter
alia, state whether the examination has been conducted in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards, and must describe any audit-
ing procedures considered necessary in the circumstances which have been
omitted.45 As a result of the same investigation, the Commission also
concluded that two auditing procedures which at the time of the Mc-
39 SEC Regulation S-X, rule 2.01, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01.
40 See, e.g., SEC Accounting Series Release Nos. 126 (July 5, 1972); 81 (Dec. 11, 1958);
47 (Jan. 25, 1944).
41 See, e.g., SEC Accounting Series Release Nos. 132 (July 19, 1972); 102 (Dec. 7,
1965).
42 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150 (Dec. 20, 1973).
43 SEC, REGULATION S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1973).
44 Rule 2.02 of SEC Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. 210.2-02, not only prescribes in certain
respects the form of an auditor's report (as to such matters as dating and signing) but also
requires that the report state whether the audit was made in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards and whether any auditing procedures generally recognized as normal
or determined necessary by the accountant have been omitted; requires the expression of an
opinion as to consistency of application or as to material changes therein; and requires iden-
tification of any matters to which the accountant takes exception.
45 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 21 (Dec. 5, 1941).
[Vol. 85
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Kesson-Robbins affair had been considered by the profession to be option-
al-namely, observation of the physical taking of inventory, and written
confirmation with third parties of receivables-should be standard proce-
dures; but the Commission did not adopt any rule so requiring. Instead,
it recognized with approval that the organized profession itself had al-
ready taken the steps necessary to make these standard auditing proce-
dures."6 There is one instance where the Commission has issued very
detailed rules with respect to conduct of an audit: this is in connection
with its requirements for the audit of broker/dealers.4  These require-
ments, however, do not apply directly to accountants; rather, they impose
upon the broker/dealer an obligation to secure an audit which meets the
detailed requirements. The requirements become an obligation of the
auditor, of course, by reason of his contractual engagement with the
broker/dealer to perform an audit that will satisfy the exigencies of the
form.
Pronouncements by the profession itself, through the AICPA, also
play an important role in defining accountants' duties under the federal
securities laws. Virtually all of the authoritative guidance with respect
to the conduct of audits is thus to be found in the series of Statements on
Auditing Procedure, which have recently been codified and renamed
Statements on Auditing Standards.4" These pronouncements will normally
be given deference not only by the SEC, as detailed above, but also by the
courts. 4
9
40 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 19 (Dec. 5, 1940). To be sure, the tone of this
pronouncement suggests that the Commission believed that it would have had authority to
impose its own requirement that these two audit procedures be performed if the organized
profession had not already acted on the matter. In addition, the amendments to Rule 2.02
of Regulation S-X which were adopted in SEC's Accounting Series Release No. 21 included
a paragraph dealing with the auditor's consideration of and reliance on the client's internal
control. These provisions, which were subsequently omitted from Rule 2-02, SEC Accounting
Series Release No. 70 (Dec. 20, 1950), amounted to direct (albeit limited) prescription of
the scope and conduct of the audit.
Although the Commission has thus indicated its belief that it has some authority to pre-
scribe auditing procedures, and has in limited degree exercised such authority, it is dubious
that the Commission has any very extensive authority in this regard. The only sources of such
authority would be the general provisions of § 19(a) of the Securities Act and § 23(a) of
the Exchange Act, which, while they can be clearly read to grant authority to prescribe ac-
counting presentation and (by way of defining the term "certificate") the form and content
of acceptable auditor's reports, say no more about authority to prescribe the manner in which
auditors do their work than they do about how lawyers, who also file professional opinions
with the SEC, should do their work. Cf. ALI FEDERAL SECURMES CODE § 1503 (a) (Ten-
tative Draft No. 3, 1974) and comments thereto.
47 See SEC Form X-17A-5.
4 8 SAS 1.
49 See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Swartz, Brezenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d
847, 852 (4th Cir. 1972).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The courts' own views of what the standards should be also firnish
a part of the definition of accountants' responsibilities under the secur-
ities laws. A result of this is that the pronouncements and general un-
derstanding of the profession will not necessarily set the limits on ac-
countants' duties. For example, in the Continental Vending case the
court stated:
Generally accepted accounting principles instruct: an accountant what
to do in the usual case where he has no reason to doubt that the affairs
of the corporation are being honestly conducted. Once he has reason to
believe that this basic assumption is false ... full disclosure must be the
rule unless he has made sure that the wrong has bc:en righted and pro-
cedures to avoid repetition have been established. 50
The courts, writing federal common law in this area, have also looked
to ordinary common law."'
D. The Exigence of the Accountants' Duties
The rigor of the accountants' duties under the federal securities laws,
and the reciprocal threshold of legal liability, vary according to the fac-
tual situation' and the particular source of legal liabilities.53 The per-
tinent scale has four stops: The first is a duty of reasonable care with
attendant liability for negligence; the second is a duty of honest belief,
grounds for belief, and minimal care with the attendant liability being
for recklessness, gross negligence, or constructive fraud; the third is
simple honesty, in the sense of a clean heart and empty mind with at-
tendant liability for fraud; and the final stop on the scale is no duty at
all and thus no liability.
The situation in which the accountant has issued an opinion as auditor
is, as already noted, that in which the accountant's obligations, not only
professional but also legal, are most demanding-but the exact degree of
care required will vary according to the statutory provision involved. Re-
gardless of that variable, honesty on the accountant's part is in all cir-
cumstances required. Lack of honesty, in connection with a material mis-
statement or omission in the financial statements to which his opinion
pertains, can lead to exposure to criminal liability as well as civil liability
under any of the otherwise applicable civil provisions.
Where § 11 of the Securities Act is applicable, the standard is reason-
"oUnited States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806-807 (2d Cir. 1969), cort denied, 397 U.S.
1006 (1970).
51See, e.g., Fischer v. Kletz, 256 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (the Yale Express
case).
52 See part I A supra.
53 See Part I C upra.
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able care; that is, in the terms of the statute, "reasonable investigation"
and "reasonable grounds to believe," as well as actual belief, are re-
quired.5 Under rule 10b-5 the standard can fairly be said to be honest
belief and some ground therefore, plus a minimal level of care. How-
ever, the question of care under rule 10b-5 has not yet been settled. The
Second Circuit has made clear its view that liability of a person acting as
an accountant ordinarily does (that is, not a participant in the transaction
or dealing face to face with the plaintiff, and facing claims only for
money damage relief) will ordinarily require a showing of something
more than ordinary negligence."5 Other circuits have expressed the view,
at least in dictum, that negligence alone will suffice;"6 but no Courts of
Appeals have squarely so held.0 7 I think the Second Circuit has the
sounder view of the matter. 8
The ALI's Federal Securities Code in its current draft form would
largely settle the question otherwise, making negligence the general stan-
dard not only for offerings of securities (now covered by § 11) but for
Exchange Act registration statements and Form 10-K filings (now cov-
ered by rule 10b-5) as well. 9
With respect to the second factual situation-that is, where the ac-
countant is associated with unaudited financial statements which bear
his name and his disclaimer of opinion-the accountant's only obliga-
tion under the federal securities laws is one of honesty, and consequent-
ly, his liability is only for actual fraud (that is, actual knowledge of
error or omission). The accountant could incur such liability for fraud
either on the basis of having prepared the financial statements, or on the
basis that his ostensible association with them, by reason of his disclaim-
er, implies a representation that he is unaware of any error4'
There is surely no good reason to believe that there is any third party
liability for ordinary negligence with respect to unaudited financials under
the securities laws. The principal statutory provision under which that is
54 Securities Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970).
55 See, e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971).
56 See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) and White v. Abrams,
CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 94,457 (9th Cir. 1974); Kohler v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.
1963); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
Z7 See BucKro, Scienter and Rule 10b.5, 67 N.W. L REV. 562 (1972); but cf. Drake
v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. I11. 967).
0 8 See the separate opinion of Judge Adams in Kohn v. American Metal Clinax, 458
F.2d 255, 279-88 (3d Cir. 1972).
59ALI Federal Securities Code § 1403 Tentative Draft No. 2 (March 1973).
O See SAS 1, § 516.06.
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the standard of fault, § 11 of the Securities Act, contemplates no liability
whatever for an accountant with respect to unaudited financials."'
As to possible liability with respect to unaudited financials for some-
thing in between negligence and outright fraud, under rule 10b-5 the
critical fact should be that the accountant does not represent, by reason
of his "association" with the financial statements or his disclaimer of
opinion thereon, that he has performed any procedures at all with respect
to them, to which degrees of care might attach. "The certified public
accountant has no responsibility to apply any auditing procedures to un-
audited statements. ' 62  There should therefore be no such liability.
Some caveats must be added to the foregoing discussion, for it appears
that the Commission is at least contemplating imposing some greater de-
gree of responsibility on accountants for unaudited financial statements
filed with the Commission.0 3  In addition, the AICPA's Auditing Stan-
dards Division has published an exposure draft of a Guide for Engage-
ments of Certified Public Accountants to Prepare Unaudited Financial
Statements, which among other things suggests that certain standard pro-
cedures should be applied by accountants in preparing or assisting the
preparation of unaudited financial statements. 4 If certain procedures did
become standard, and authoritatively declared to be such, there would of
course be an implicit representation by an accountant associated with un-
01 An accountant does incur some responsibility under Securities Act § 11 with respect
to the unaudited "stub period" financials covering a period subsequent to the date of the
audited financials, which are included in the registration statement. This responsibility arises
from the fact that in his capacity as an expert under § 11(b) (3) (B) he must show that after
reasonable investigation he had reasonable grounds to believe that there were no material
misstatements or omissions in the audited financial statements at the time the registration
statement became effective. Thus there is a requirement of reasonable investigation covering
the period between the date of the audited financials and the effective date of the registration
statement. This investigation is commonly called an "S-1 review," and it requires among
other things review of the unaudited financials. See SAS No. 1, § 710.08. The accountant's
responsibility in this regard, however, goes not to the unaudited stub period financials as such,
but only to an error or omission which they might bring to light in the audited financials.
Also in connection with Securities Act registration statements, the accountant is ordinarily
requested to furnish a "comfort letter" to the underwriters, see SAS No. 1, § 630. The review
underlying the comfort letter includes some limited review of the unaudited financial infor-
mation contained in the prospectus. Inadequate performance by the accountant of this lim.
ited review might give rise to liability to the underwriters, and the standards of such liability
might be negligence. Since the representations made in the comfort letter are made in con.
nection with a purchase of securities by the underwriter, such liability might be predicated
on rule 10b-5.
02SAS 1 § 516.02. An accountant who has prepared or reviewed unaudited financial
statements for the client might, of course, be liable to the client for negligence. Such liability,
however, would rest on common law, not the federal securities laws.
03 See Address by Ray Garrett, Jr. to AICPA, Oct. 16, 1973.
0 4 AICPA, TASK FORCE ON UNAUDITED STATEMENTS OF iTHE AUDIrNG STANDARDS
DivIsIoN, GUIDE FOR ENGAGEMENTS OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS TO PREPARE
UNAUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (Exposure Draft, March 1974).
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audited financial statements that he had performed such procedures; and
a failure to perform them, or to perform them with appropriate care,
could give rise to liability. Even though the formulation of the standard
of care-reasonable care, slight care plus honest belief and grounds for
belief, etc.-would then presumably be the same as that applicable to
audited financials, the procedures required to be performed in order to
meet that care would of course be much less elaborate.
As respects the third factual situation identified above-that is, in
which the accountant has prepared financial information for his client,
but did not prepare it for public presentation, so that when the infor-
mation is disseminated by the client it carries no representation, express
or implied, on the part of the accountant-it seems beyond serious ques-
tion that no more than plain honesty is required of the accountant. Cor-
respondingly, he will not be liable to third parties except for fraud.";
II. WHISTLE-BLOWING
Let us, then, turn to the fourth of the situations identified above: in
which the accountant is aware of errors or omissions in filings by his
client with the Commission, or other improprieties or misconduct by the
client or its officers, but these do not have any material effect on financial
statements for which the accountant has responsibility, and the accountant
has neither direct nor ostensible responsibility for them, but merely
knowledge. Does the accountant in these circumstances have an obliga-
tion to convey that knowledge to others-in the present context, the Com-
mission 6 6-and a consequent exposure to liability for failure to make such
report?
It may be useful preliminarily to make clear some of the issues that
are not raised by this question. Since, by definition, errors, commissions,
or improprieties have no material effect on the financials which the ac-
countant has audited, no question is raised as to the accountant's obliga-
tion to detect fraud in the course of his audit.6" For the same reason, no
question is raised as to the accountant's obligation to deal with facts that
he discovers after issuing his opinion, but which existed at the time he
issued it, and which have a material impact on the financial statements
to which his opinion refers." Nor, finally, is any issue raised with respect
65 Cf. Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
6 6 As a practical matter, if whistle-blowing is done by accountants, it will most likely be
done to the Commission and not to the public at large, because (a) this is easier to do, (b)
the Commission is better situated to take remedial measures if they are called for, and (c) if
there is complaint by reason of an accountant's failure to blow, the source of that complaint
is likely to be the Commission.
67 SAS 1, § 110.05-.08.
08See Fischer v. Kletz, 265 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); SAS 1, § 561.01-.10.
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to the accountant's obligations concerning events occurring subsequent to
the date of the financial statements to which his opinion relates, but prior
to issuance or reissuance of his opinion which affect the financial state.
ments on which he has opinedY
It may also be useful to point out that as a practical matter, the ques-
tion of whether or not to "blow the whistle" will not arise before the end
of a chain of events which is likely in most cases to foreclose the ques-
tion at an earlier point. If an accountant does become aware of a prob.
lem, even one relating to matters for which he is not directly responsible,
he will of course bring it to the attention of his client. It is not, hope-
fully, unrealistic to think that in most instances a client made aware of a
significant misstatement or omission will take appropriate steps to correct
it, and similarly, if made aware of misconduct by an officer or employee,
will take steps to cure it. In addition, the accountant will sometimes be
making representations to others with respect to the area in which the
problems arise, by way of a comfort letter. When this is so, he will pre-
sumably make reference to the problem in the comfort letter; and the
recipient of that letter will take such action as is necessary to see to it that
the matter is corrected. 70  It is only if others to whose attention the ac-
countant brings the problem fail to act that the question whether the ac-
countant himself should take action arises.
The Commission's position on the question is fairly clear. Its allega-
tions in the NSMC complaint assert that the accountants involved, who
had in three successive comfort letters brought material error in the in-
terim financial statements to the attention not only of their client but of
the board of directors, the other party to the transaction, and counsel for
both parties, and had in the last of their letters explicitly suggested that
the financial statement should be corrected, should, when none of the
recipients acted, have themselves brought the matter to the attention of
the Commission or the stockholders.7' What are the possible grounds
for such an obligation? Certainly there is no statutory ground. The
obligation in question could doubtless be imposed by statute; but this has
not been done. Conceivably, this obligation might be imposed by regula-
tion, although the statutory authority for such a regulation would be ques-
tionable. In any event, however, this has not been done, and certainly
had not been done at the time of the events brought in question by the
69 SAS 1, § 560-01-.09.
70 This can reasonably be expected if the recipient of the comfort letter is an underwriter,
and a public offering is involved. It should, however, be recognized that in the NSMC case
the redpients of the comfort letters did not take action.
71 Complaint, SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civ. No. 225-72 f1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,913-17 (D.D.C. 1972).
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NSMC complaint. Although there has been talk, from Commission
sources, of a concept of "auditor of record" which presumably would
entail some responsibility of accountants for the affairs of their clients
generally,72 this concept has not been implemented by formal Commission
action. The closest the Commission has come to imposing a whistle-
blowing obligation by regulation is in Item 12 of Form 8-K, dealing with
changes in auditors, which requires a statement by the registrant as to
whether there were certain kinds of disagreements with the former audi-
tor; and also requires that the registrant secure from the former auditor
a letter covering the same subject, which must be filed with the Commis-
sion. The requirement applies, as a direct matter, to the registrant; but
there is little doubt that the former auditor is effectively obliged to fur-
nish the letter. This reporting requirement, of course, carries some po-
tential for bringing to the Commission's attention improprieties that do
not directly affect financial statements for which an accountant has taken
formal responsibility.
An obligation to report certain kinds of misconduct might also con-
ceivably be made a condition for practice before the Commission; but
again this has not been done; and there is considerable room for doubt
that under the present statutes it could be done.' 3
The NSMC complaint asserts that the obligation in question is a
"professional"7 4 one. The reference here could be either to the recog-
nized standards of the profession, which in the case of the accounting
profession are in large degree to be found in formal pronouncements
of the AICPA, or else to ethical standards, which also have been codified.
If the former reference was intended, then presumably it points to what
is now codified in the AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1
§ 561. It could hardly be clearer, however, that this provision of the pro-
fessional literature applies only to audited financial statements, for which
of course the auditor takes both actually and ostensibly a far greater de-
gree of responsibility than is the case with unaudited financials.75
72 See Address by A. A. Sommer, Jr., "The Four Musts Of Financial Reporting" (January
8, 1974).
73 The Commission's Rules of Practice, including its rules with respect to qualification
and disqualification of professionals to practice before it, have no statutory basis except the
general Commission authority under § 19(a) of the Securities Act and § 23(a) of the Ex-
change Act. In addition, as to lawyers, there is a statute, P.L 89-332, which provides that
any member in good standing of the bar of any jurisdiction has a right to practice before
any Federal agency: this, of course, hardly can be construed as a grant of authority to impose
conditions upon the practice of lawyers.
74 See note 71, supra.
75 SAS 1, § 561.01 provides:
.01 The procedures described in this section should be followed by the auditor
who, subsequent to the date of his report upon audited financial Jaemenvs, be-
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What, then, about the possibility of an ethical requirement? If it
were lawyers, rather than accountants involved, then in certain circum-
stances there would indeed be an ethical requirement to report improper
conduct by the client."' This obligation, however, applies to criminal
conduct or fraud occurring in the course of the lawyer's representation
of the client.Y This appears to mean that the improper activity of which
the lawyer has knowledge must have a considerable degree of gravity
to it; and in addition, that the activity is closely related to the- subject
matter of the attorney-client relationship.
There is no comparable ethical provision with respect to accountants.
This perhaps reflects the fact that the problem is not one which can be
expected to arise with any significant frequency in the practice of accoun-
tants; and, more fundamentally, the fact that it is not part of the ordi-
nary professional role of accountants, as it is of lawyers, to assist their
clients in dealing with the consequences of their own improprieties.
There is, of course, a difference between lawyers and accountants on the
other side of the scale as well: the lawyer is, as an ethical matter, re-
quired to observe a high degree of loyalty to his client. The loyalty is
not exclusive, but it is clearly his primary professional loyalty. The ac-
countant has substantial obligations to his client also, but his prime
role as independent auditor necessarily implies an independence of his
client's interests for which there is no close parallel in the ethical frame-
work of the bar.
Wherever the exact balance should be struck between the conflicting
obligations to the public and to the client imposed upon accountants
as a matter of professional ethics, however, there is no basis in the ac-
countant's Code of Ethics for a whistle-blowing obligation.78 The audi-
tor's obligation to the public relates to the responsibility he takes for the
comes aware that facts may have existed at that date which might have affected his
report had he then been aware of such facts. (emphasis supplied.)
70 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DIScIPLINARY RULE 7.102 (B) (1)
states:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same,
and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the af.
fected person or tribunal.
7 See also Id., DISCIPLINARY RULE 4-101 (c) (3) regarding planned future crimes.
8 8 The principal source of ethical requirements is the AICPA's Code of Professional Ethics,
adopted in restated form effective March 1, 1973. Most of the State Boards of Accountancy
have also promulgated codes of ethics, whose jurisdictional scope is somewhat larger than that
of the AICPA Code because they apply not only to CPA's who are not members of the AICPA
but also to certain other classes of licensed practitioners. Almost all of these codes follow
the model of the AICPA Code, either in its present form or in the form of previous versions
of it. None of these codes contains any provision with respect to whistle-blowing.
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financial statements of the client when he issues an opinion on them. He
does not purport by that opinion, or by his continuing role as independent
auditor, to vouch for the rectitude of the client in any field other than
the financial one, or in that field with respect to anything other than
the financial statements which bear his report. Moreover, he has a clear
ethical obligation of confidence to his client.7
No source of a whistle-blowing duty is to be found in any general
duty of citizens to report crimes. Virtually any material error of non-
disclosure affecting the securities market, persisted in willfully (as would
presumptively be the case after the accountant had brought the matter to
his client's attention, and the client had refused to take action on it),
constitutes a felony. Concealing a felony, of course, is itself the crime
of misprison, which is defined as follows:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon
as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil
or military authority under the United States, shall be fined not more
than $500 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.80
Although the phrase "conceals and does not as soon as possible make
known" could well be read as requiring no more than a passive failure
to report a crime, the courts have found in the statute a requirement
that there be, in addition to knowledge and inaction, "some affirmative
act of concealment." 81
Thus if the question is asked whether an auditor has an obligation to
report his corporate client's illegal contributions in the last presidential
compaign to the Special Prosecutor's office, the answer, if the penalties
to which the client is subject would not be financially material, is no.$-
The answer, so far as criminal law, and citizens' duties, are concerned,
should be the same with respect to a client's violations of the federal se-
curities laws.
There is, finally, the possibility that a failure to blow the whistle
7 AICPA, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, rule 301.
80 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
81United States v. Doddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
905 (1971).
821he penalty for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 610 is, so far as the corporate miscreant is
concerned, a fine of $5,000--a sum which would hardly be financially material for any reg-
istrant subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. See, however, Ash v. Cort, No. 73-179, 3d
Cir. May 8, 1974, BNA SEcUarrIEs LAW AND REGULATION REPORaTER, May 8, 1974, p. A-1,
where the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that violations of this provision may
give rise to an implied stockholders derivative action. See aso, Securities Act Release No.
5466, CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 5 79-699, publishing the views of the Commission's Division
of Corporation Finance to the effect that both a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 610 and a pend-
ing indictment or information thereunder should be disclosed in proxies and information state-
ments, and on Form 10-K and Form 8-K.
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would be found to. constitute aiding and abetting of the client's miscon-
duct, for purposes of civil liability in either a. private damage action
or an injunctive proceeding by the Commission. Aiding and abetting
in a civil as in a criminal context should, however, require an affirma-
tive act of assistance or concealment, and a mere failure to report or dis-
close should not give rise to liability.83 If this is so, then naturally there
is no duty to blow the whistle.
In Brennan v. Midwestern Life Ins. Co., 4 however, liability was
found to lie under rule 10b-5 against a life insurance company by rea-
son of market manipulations involving its stock by a securities dealer
who made a market in its stock. The insurance company was not itself
accused of manipulative activities, but only of aiding and abetting the
manipulations, by reason of its failure to report the activities to either
the state securities commission or the SEC. The court held, in sub-
stance, that aiding and abetting could be found in that case from evi-
dence that showed little more than inaction in the face of knowledge
that the violations were continuing. There are significant grounds on
which the situation of an auditor should be distinguished from that of
the defendant in the Brennan case, including the interest of the defen-
dant in its own stock, which was the subject of the manipulations, and
the fact that an auditor has a professional obligation of confidence.
The case does, however, carry a lesson for accountants as well as others:
that it does not take much, in a case where an offense is continuing or
repetitive, to support a finding of aiding and abetting a violation of law
by another with whom one has a continuing relationship.
I conclude, therefore, that there is no legal obligation on an accoun-
tant to report to the Commission or other governmental authority his cli-
ent's errors, omissions and misdeeds. I also conclude, however, that as a
practical matter, it will often be safer, and more sensible, for the accoun-
tant to follow a course whidh is other than that which would be dictated
by considerations of legal obligation alone. In some cases the best course
may be not to tattle but simply to part company with the client. In others
it may be advisable to persuade the client itself to disclose the problem,
or consent to its disclosure.
Where the offense is completed and not likely to be repeated (cor-
porate contributions to a federal election campaign seem apt examples
these days), and gives no reason to suspect that the client is prone to il-
legality or dishonestly generally, there is little reason for the accountant
to take action at all.
83See Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
S 450 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1971).
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Where, on the other hand, the offense is of a continuing or repetitive
kind, and the accountant'cannot persuade the client to desist, there is a
great deal to be said for the accountant simply terminating his relation-
ship with the client. The unreliability-indeed, by hypothesis. obdurate
willingness to persist in error-manifested by the client with regard to
one matter for which the accountant does not have responsibility may well
extend to other matters, for which he does. The longer the accountant
continues his association with the client, moreover, the greater will be the
risk of a pattern developing which will later be susceptible to construc-
tion as aiding and abetting the client's misconduct.
Finally, there will be situations where, though the accountant may not
himself feel free to report on his client, he will have every reason to per-
suade the client itself to make disclosure or correction. One such reason
is that, as a prudential matter, considerable weight should be given to the
view of the Commission about whistle-blowing that is manifested in
NSMC, regardless of the flimsiness of that position's legal underpinnings.
After all, when and if the case is decided on the merits, the Commission
may, contrary to reason, prove right; and until proven wrong it is ob-
viously ready to sue.
The toughest problem is likely to be presented by discovery of a ma-
terial error or omission in a current filing, which continues to influence
the market and which, so long as it is uncorrected, amounts to a continu-
ing offense. Here the need for disclosure'is most acute; but so is the risk
that disclosure will bring about serious consequences to the client.
Though difficult in theory this is perhaps not quite so bad in practice,
since if the error or omission is such as to give rise to a potential liability
for the issuer, disclosure may have to be made in the next annual finan-
cial statements. The auditor's pointing this out to the client may well
offer sufficient leverage to get the client to make the necessary correction
or disclosure.
